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Abstract—We study the detection and delay performance
impacts of a feature-based physical layer authentication (PLA)
protocol in mission-critical machine-type communication (MTC)
networks. The PLA protocol uses generalized likelihood-ratio
testing based on the line-of-sight (LOS), single-input multiple-
output channel-state information in order to mitigate imper-
sonation attempts from an adversary node. We study the de-
tection performance, develop a queueing model that captures
the delay impacts of erroneous decisions in the PLA (i.e., the
false alarms and missed detections), and model three different
adversary strategies: data injection, disassociation, and Sybil
attacks. Our main contribution is the derivation of analytical
delay performance bounds that allow us to quantify the delay
introduced by PLA that potentially can degrade the performance
in mission-critical MTC networks. For the delay analysis, we
utilize tools from stochastic network calculus. Our results show
that with a sufficient number of receive antennas (approx. 4-8)
and sufficiently strong LOS components from legitimate devices,
PLA is a viable option for securing mission-critical MTC systems,
despite the low latency requirements associated to corresponding
use cases. Furthermore, we find that PLA can be very effective
in detecting the considered attacks, and in particular, it can
significantly reduce the delay impacts of disassociation and Sybil
attacks.
Index Terms—Delay performance, low-latency machine-type
communication, wireless physical layer security, physical layer
authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
A
S mission-critical machine-type communication (MTC)
emerges as a new approach to interconnect cyber-
physical infrastructures, also new requirements on security
features arise. Mission-critical machine-type communication
targets at low latencies and high transmission reliabilities, in
order to realize new use cases for instance arising in industrial
automation. Thus, while in human-oriented communication
data confidentiality followed by integrity form the utmost
priorities (while service availability and security overhead typ-
ically have less relevance), the priorities change in the mission-
critical setting. In detail, the order of concern is reversed [1]:
Service availability has highest priority since automation appli-
cations are typically supposed to run uninterrupted over long
time spans. The second highest priority has message integrity,
as in a closed control loop it is of vital importance that sensor
and actuation information is not altered during transmission,
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while it also must be assured that the received data indeed
stems from the claiming source. Finally, confidentiality is of
least importance, as in automation applications the reading of
sensor and actuation information poses only little threat to
the controlled plant. Paired with the general requirement for
low transmission latencies, these inverted security priorities are
challenging, as traditionally integrity is assured through crypto
schemes on the higher layers, which comes with significant
computational complexities.
Physical layer authentication (PLA) has been proposed as a
lightweight alternative for crypto security for authentication in
reliable MTC communications [2]. In general, PLA schemes
perform hypothesis testing based on dedicated features of the
communication pair like, e.g., the location-specific channel
frequency response [3] or a device-specific local oscillator off-
set [4] to determine if transmissions originate from legitimate
sources. The advantage of this method is that messages can
be authenticated quickly at the physical layer, without relying
on cryptographic methods at higher layers and with slim-to-
none security overhead. However, such schemes also come
with drawbacks. First of all, due to the hypothesis testing PLA
inevitably results in false alarms from time to time (i.e., some
legitimate messages will be erroneously rejected) which can
necessitate a retransmission. Furthermore, missed detections
(i.e., accepting messages from an adversary) can occur if
communication is subject to an impersonation attack. Thus,
despite the complexity advantages, PLA also comes with costs
which potentially can be significant in the context of mission-
critical MTC. This raises the question how these costs (i.e.,
false positives and missed detections) potentially impact in
particular the delay performance of a mission-critical MTC
system.
Related work so far has largely not been addressing this
question. PLA for mission-critical MTC is proposed for
instance in [2, 5] but without considering the impact on
the delay. In [6], the reduction in delay from removing
authentication-induced processing delays in cell-handovers by
using PLA is simulated. However, this paper does not focus
on MTC and additionally does not take false alarms of PLA
into account. Ozmen et al. considers the delay-sensitive perfor-
mance of a communication system under information-theoretic
secrecy [7, 8]. Delay in these works is characterized through
the concept of effective capacity, which essentially allows the
approximation of queuing-related performance metrics like the
2backlog or latency. Furthermore in [9], the delay performance
of a Rayleigh fading wiretap channel is studied using stochas-
tic network calculus for queueing analysis. All papers [7–9]
apply queueing analysis tools to study the delay impacts of
different physical layer security techniques, however, none of
them consider PLA.
In this work, we address the issue of delay analysis, and thus
the cost, of PLA for mission-critical MTC. We consider a cen-
tralized MTC network running a mission-critical application in
which devices need to deliver data to the access point reliably
and with low latency. In the considered network, we intro-
duce a standard generalized-likelihood-ratio test PLA scheme,
which we extend to take multiple-message authentication into
account. We model several strategies that the adversary can
use, namely data injection, disassociation, and Sybil attacks,
and analyze the detection performance for each scenario. To
derive the delay performance impacts, we develop link-level
queueing models that take the PLA errors and actions of
the adversary into account. For queuing analysis, we employ
tools from stochastic network calculus [10, 11]. This work
significantly extend the scope of our previous study [12] of
delay impacts of PLA that only considered a single antenna
system without an active attacker.
The contributions of our paper are the following: We derive
delay performance bounds for MTC links where PLA is used
for combating various attack strategies. We develop models
for how data injection, disassociation, and Sybil attacks are
launched against a MTC network and their impact on the
queueing delay performance. With respect to stochastic net-
work calculus, we provide an approximation to a previously
unsolved mathematical problem: an upper bound on the delay
violation probability over a Rice fading single-input multiple-
output channel. From our results, we conclude that PLA, under
relatively strong line-of-sight conditions and with sufficient
number of receive antennas, can indeed provide high security
in a mission-critical application. We also show that PLA ef-
fectively reduce the impact of disassociation and Sybil attacks
at the cost of an approximately constant increase in delay
violation probability. Thus, our results show that despite some
costs, PLA promises to be an effective scheme in ensuring
message integrity even in mission-critical MTC systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II in-
troduces the system assumptions and our problem formulation.
In Section III, we describe the attacker models and their impact
on the queueing model. Section IV is devoted to deriving the
delay performance bounds using tools from stochastic network
calculus. In Section V, we present our numerical results, and
Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation: Matrices are represented by bold capital symbols
X, and XT and X† denote the matrix transpose and conjugate
transpose, respectively. We let tr(X) denote the trace of a
matrix. Bold symbols x represents vectors with entries xi
and IN denotes the (N × N) identity matrix. We let ‖x‖ =√|x1|2 + ...+ |xn|2 be the Euclidian norm. For an event E,
we let P(E) and I(E) denote the probability and indicator
function, respectively. For a random variable X , E[X ] denotes
its expected value and fX(x) and FX(x) its probability
density and cumulative distribution function, respectively. We
let CN (µ,Σ) represent the multivariate complex Gaussian
distribution with mean µ and covariance matrix Σ, N (µ,Σ)
the corresponding real-valued Gaussian distribution, χ2k a
central χ2 distribution with k degrees of freedom, and χ2k(λ)
a non-central χ2 distribution with k degrees of freedom and
non-centrality parameter λ.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present a centralized MTC network
model consisting of Kd wireless devices communicating up-
link data to an access point, as depicted in Fig. 1. The network
is assumed to run a mission-critical application in which
the MTC devices buffer data (e.g., sensor measurements)
that need to be delivered reliably to the access point with
minimal delay, as for example in motion control or generally
in factory automation. Furthermore, as depicted in Fig. 1, we
assume that there is an adversary present in the vicinity of
the network, attempting to disturb the system using stealthy
wireless impersonation attacks that are compliant with the
typical behavior of legitimate devices within the network
(e.g., sending payloads, data or disconnection requests). For
protection against such attacks, the access point is using a
feature-based physical layer authentication (PLA) protocol that
compares the channel-state information associated with each
transmission to a pre-stored feature bank. The access point
is assumed to be equipped with NRx antennas, both in order
to improve the PLA detection performance and to improve
capacity, while the MTC devices (e.g., small sensors) are
assumed to have single antennas. The stationary feature bank
consists of the statistics of the phased-array antenna responses
from each device to the multiple-antenna access point, and we
assume that the devices are deployed such that a line-of-sight
(LOS) path to the access point is available.
A. Medium Access and Physical Layer
We assume that the MTC devices access the wireless
medium in a frame-based structure, each beginning with
a beacon transmitted by the access point for synchroniza-
tion, followed by a management (MGMT) period where
devices can make various requests1. A device can request
connecting to the access point (CN), disconnecting (DCN),
or resources for transmission of data payload (DTA). The
allocation of resources is then communicated to the devices in
a broadcast period (BP), followed by the data transmission
period (DTP) where devices transmit buffered data. This
medium-access model is similar to existing standards such
as LTE [13] and beacon-enabled IEEE 802.14e [14]. We
let IMGMT(k) denote the set of request messages received
in the MGMT period in frame k, each associated with a
request REQ(m) ∈ {DTA,CN,DCN} and a device identifier
ID(m) ∈ {1, · · · ,Kd} (e.g., an identification code such as a
MAC address). We denote by IDTP(k) the set of devices that
are granted DTP resources in frame k and we assume that the
access point expects at most one request from each device.
1The MGMT phase is based on contention access; however, we assume that
collisions are handled appropriately such that we can neglect their impact.
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Fig. 1. Single-antenna MTC devices (e.g., wireless sensors in a critical monitoring application) communicating in uplink to a multiple-antenna access point.
The access point is equipped with a feature-based PLA protocol.
We assume the DTP has a fixed length of NFrame complex
symbols that are divided by TDMA to the devices in IDTP(k).
A fair division of resources is assumed, where the number of
symbols each device gets allocated in frame k is denoted by2
Nk =
⌊
NFrame
|IDTP(k)|
⌋
, (1)
where ⌊x⌋ denotes the largest integer smaller than x. We
denote the (NRx × NFrame) complex symbols received at the
access point in frame k by Yk = [Yk,i1 · · ·Yk,i|IDTP | ] and let
yk,i(n) denote the nth column of Yk,i (i.e., the observation of
the nth symbol received from device i in frame k). The single-
input multiple-output (SIMO) channel is modeled according to
yk,i(n) = hk,ixk,i(n) +wk,i(n), (2)
for n ∈ {1, · · · , Nk}, where hk,i represent the channel
vector between device i and the access point in frame k,
xk,i(n) are the transmitted data symbols, and wk,i(n) ∼
CN (0, N0INRx) is the additive noise represented by a circular
symmetric complex Gaussian random vector. We assume that
E[‖hk,i‖2] = PiNRx where Pi represent the average power
received per antenna from device i. We model the channel
hk,i as a narrowband SIMO Rice fading channel, i.e., hk,i ∼
CN (µi,Σi) with µi representing the LOS component and
covariance matrix Σi representing the fading. The covariance
matrix is given by Σi =
Pi
KRice+1
Λ, where [Λ]i,j = ρ
|i−j|
is an (NRx × NRx) matrix, ρ is a correlation coefficient, and
KRice is a common Rice factor experienced by all antennas and
all devices in the network. Furthermore, we assume that the
frame period is shorter than the coherence time of the channel
so that the channel realizations hk,i can be assumed to be
constant within a frame, independent from frame to frame,
and independent among the MTC devices.
For device i, positioned at distance di and with angle of
arrival (AoA) Φi relative to the receiver antenna array, the
channel mean (i.e., the LOS component) is modeled as a
phased-array antenna µi = ae
−
j2πdi
λc e(Ωi), where λc is the
carrier wavelength, Ωi = cos(Φi) is the directional cosine,
a = ‖µi‖, and e(Ωi) is the unit spatial signature given by
2Note that Nk in general is a random variable depending on the number of
users allocated in the frame, and that Nk can get very small if many devices
request resources at the same time.
e(Ωi) =
1√
NRx
[
z0, zΩi , · · · , z(NRx−1)Ωi] (3)
in terms of the complex number z = e−j2π∆r , where ∆r
is the antenna spacing (normalized by the wavelength) [15].
From normalization of E[‖hk,i‖2] we get a =
√
PiNRxKRice
KRice+1
,
and we assume the received power follows as Pi = P0d
−β/2
i
where β is a path-loss exponent, P0 is the transmit power, and
di is the distance. Additionally, in the following we normalize
the noise power spectral density N0 = 1 such that PiNRx also
represents the average received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) on
the ith link.
Remark 1. The assumption of a narrow-band slow-fading
LOS channel may appear as too restrictive at a first glance.
However, it is relevant in scenarios with low or no device
mobility and where the MTC deployment has been carefully
planned, for instance, to use LOS beamforming for physical
layer security [16]. Furthermore, these conditions allow us to
upper bound the delay performance; if delay requirements are
violated in this model, PLA will not be applicable for other
models either.
B. Feature-Based Physical Layer Authentication
With an adversary present, the validity of the message IDs
are uncertain and the access point needs to determine their
legitimacy. For PLA based on the observed channel states,
the access point is assumed to have access to a feature bank
consisting of the channel distributions CN (µi,Σ) that are
associated with each legitimate channel and are used for
hypothesis testing. In a real system, the access point can
obtain the feature bank through learning based on legitimate
transmissions (c.f., [17]). In this work, however, we assume
that the distributions in the feature bank are perfectly known
and the process by which they are obtained is omitted. For a
received set of messages I = {m1, · · · ,mM}, we denote by
h˜mi = CSI(mi) the observed SIMO channel state associated
with each message mi. In general, this channel state is an
estimate with limited precision. However, to simplify the
analysis we assume perfect channel-state knowledge in the
following. Furthermore, we assume that PLA is applied to
4I ∈ {IMGMT, IDTP}, i.e., MGMT requests and DTP data
payloads are authenticated separately.
We consider now the case when L messages share the same
ID (e.g., due to multiple impersonated messages injected by an
adversary). The PLA procedure divides the set I into subsets
Ii = {m ∈ I : ID(m) = i} of messages with the same ID,
each authenticated independently. To test the legitimacy of the
messages in the set Ii, the access point constructs a L+1-ary
hypothesis test. We here denote by Hl for l ∈ {1, · · · , L},
the disjoint hypotheses that message ml is authentic, i.e., that
we believe h˜ml ∼ CN (µID(ml),ΣID(ml)), and by H0 the
hypothesis that no message in IL is authentic. The decision
of Hl results in accepting ml and rejecting the rest, while
the decision of H0 results in rejecting all messages in Ii,
since the authentication is predicated on that the access point
expects only one message per legitimate device. The access
point decides between the L messages through
di(h˜ml)
H0
≷
Hl
T, with ml = argmin
m=m1,··· ,mL
di(h˜m), (4)
where di(·) is a discriminant function associated with the
channel feature of the device with ID i, given by di(h˜m) =
2(h˜m−µi)†Σ−1(h˜m−µi). The minimization of the righthand
side of (4) is to be viewed as choosing the maximum-
likelihood (ML) decision (the discriminant function di(·) is
also the log-likelihood of the observation given the legitimate
distribution) while the threshold decision in the lefthand side
determines if the ML decision is authentic.
Single message authentication (L = 1): The L mes-
sage hypothesis test in (4) is an extension of the standard
generalized-likelihood-ratio test (GLRT), used for PLA when
deciding upon a multi-dimensional complex Gaussian feature
such as a multi-carrier frequency response [18] or a channel
impulse response [19]. Note that when (4) is reduced to L = 1
(i.e., only a single message with ID = i is received), the
hypothesis test becomes di(h˜m)≷
H0
H1
T , where H1 represents
that the message is legitimate and H0 represents that the
message stems from an adversary.
C. Adversarial Strategies
In this paper, we assume that a single attacker is present
in the system, referred to as Eve, having a single antenna,
located at distance dE and with AoA ΦE relative to the access
point. We model Eve’s channel similarly to the legitimate
channels with Rice factor KRice,E and denote Eve’s channel
realization in frame k by hk,E ∼ CN (µE ,ΣE), where
µE = aEe
−
j2πdE
λc e(ΩE) with the normalized spatial signature
given in (3). With this representation, we can model both the
case when Eve is an external device or when the attack is
launched from a compromised device within the network by
letting µE = µi and ΣE = Σ for some legitimate device i.
The power received from Eve’s transmissions is assumed to
be PE = P0d
−β/2
E .
Given Eve’s ability to send messages with fraudulent IDs,
we differentiate four cases of adversary behavior:
a) Baseline: Eve is present, but inactive, and the per-
formance of the system is only affected by false alarms. The
baseline scenario models the impact of introducing the PLA
protocol in the system when no attacks are attempted.
b) Data Injection Attack: Eve is sending DTA requests
impersonating a legitimate MTC device. Once successful, Eve
gets DTP resources and transmits false data with the aim
of harming the underlying application (e.g., drive a control
system into a dangerous state by introducing fake sensor or
actuation signals). In our work, we do not model the impact of
the data injection attack on the application; however, metrics
like missed detection rate (see Section II-D and III-B) measure
Eve’s success-rate under such attacks, and the number of
resources Nk each device gets scheduled will be affected.
c) Sybil Attack: Eve transmits multiple DTA requests
with fraudulent IDs, referred to as Sybil IDs/devices, with the
goal of depleting resources available to the other legitimate
devices [20]. In a Sybil attack, we assume that Eve targets
a set of inactive devices DSybil ⊂ {1, · · · ,Kd} that are not
transmitting in the frame and sends DTA requests with the
corresponding IDs. Note that it does not make sense for Eve
to target active devices in this attack since they will already
transmit DTA requests. With each successful Sybil ID, Nk in
(1) is reduced which degrades the performance of the other
links in the network.
d) Disassociation Attack: Eve targets a particular device
and sends fraudulent requests to disassociate from the access
point (DCN) with the corresponding device’s ID. If success-
ful, Eve disconnects the legitimate device which needs to
reconnect, a process we model as being disconnected for KRC
frames (e.g., due to management processes such as generating
session keys).
The impersonation attacks that we consider can be launched
by external entities (e.g., an attacker positioned in close
proximity to the system, using a stolen MTC device or a
software defined radio unit) or internal devices whose behavior
has been hijacked by malicious code. Our attacker model
allows us to model both cases by modifying the assumptions
on Eve’s channel. We note, however, that Sybil attacks are
generally assumed to originate from internal devices that are
compromised [20].
D. False Alarm and Missed Detection Rates
Here, we summarize the error events and corresponding
probabilities for the single message authentication, which are
standard results (c.f., [18] for proofs). In the L = 1 message
case, two error events can occur: (i) a false alarm when a
legitimate message is rejected; and (ii) a missed detection
when an illegitimate message is accepted. Under the legitimate
hypothesis H1, we have di(h˜m) ∼ χ22NRx and the false alarm
rate is
pFA(T ) = P(di(h˜m) > T |H1) = 1− Fχ22NRx (T ), (5)
where Fχ22NRx
(·) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of a χ2 distribution with 2NRx degrees of freedom. Observe
that for a given choice of threshold T , the false alarm rate is
equal across all device IDs i, independently of our assumptions
5on Eve. In practice, the PLA could be designed with different
thresholds Ti for different devices. However, in order to
simplify the analysis we assume a constant threshold T . Under
H0 (i.e., Eve is sending the message m with ID(m) = i),
given that Eve’s channel covariance-matrix is of the form
ΣE =
PE
1+KRice,E
Λ, we have di(h˜m) ∼ λiχ22NRx(νi), where
λi =
PE(1+KRice)
Pi(1+KRice,E)
and νi is the non-centrality parameter.
Hence, the missed detection rate is
pMD(i, T ) = P(di(h˜m) < T |H0) = Fχ22NRx (νi)(T/λi), (6)
where Fχ22NRx (νi)
(·) is the CDF of a non-central χ2 distribution
with 2NRx degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameter
νi = 2(µE −µi)†Σ−1E (µE −µi). From this we can note that
the missed detection rate varies with the device i that Eve
tries to impersonate. Error analysis for PLA with L > 1 has
to our knowledge not been studied before. In Section III-B,
we provide bounds on the missed detection rate for L = 2
and show that this case will suffice for the delay performance
analysis under the considered attack strategies.
E. Delay Performance Metric
As mentioned in Section I, the use of PLA for improved
security might have unintended consequences on the system’s
ability to meet delay requirements. To study such delay perfor-
mance issues, we introduce infinite-buffer queues that model
the flow of data from each MTC device to the access point.
The queueing model is described by the bivariate stochastic
processes
Ai(τ, t) =
t∑
k=τ
a
(i)
k , Di(τ, t) =
t∑
k=τ
d
(i)
k ,
representing the cumulative arrivals to and departures from the
queue in the time interval [τ, t) for all 0 ≤ τ ≤ t. In frame k,
a
(i)
k represents the instantaneous arrivals to the ith MTC device
buffer measured in bits (e.g., incoming sensor measurements),
and d
(i)
k represent the instantaneous departures from the ith
queue (i.e., information successfully transmitted to the access
point). The ability to transfer data from the buffer queue to
the destination at the access point is characterized by the
cumulative service process Si(τ, t) =
∑t
k=τ s
(i)
k . Considering
that a device is assigned resources, we assume that the trans-
mitter chooses a coding rate R
(i)
k , and transmits s
(i)
k = NkR
(i)
k
encoded information bits over the SIMO channel. Furthermore,
we introduce the Bernoulli random variable X
(i)
k , indicating if
resources are scheduled to device i. This results in the general
service model
s
(i)
k =
{
NkR
(i)
k , if X
(i)
k = 1
0 if X
(i)
k = 0.
(7)
We use the Shannon capacity R
(i)
k = log2(1 + γk,i) as a
proxy for the amount of bits per channel use that can be
transmitted over the channel. Assuming the access point has
perfect channel state information and uses maximum-ratio
combining for the channel model (2), the instantaneous SNR
is given by γk,i =
‖hk,i‖
2
N0
.
A widely used measure on the queueing system’s ability to
meet delay requirements is the delay violation probability [21].
The queueing delay at time point t is defined as
Wi(t) , inf{u > 0;Ai(0, t) ≤ Di(0, t+ u)}, (8)
representing the frames required to serve the bits in the queue
at time t. This delay is randomly varying due to the random
service process and the delay violation probability is defined
as pi(w) = P(Wi(t) > w), i.e., the probability that a bit is not
received within a defined deadline w. In many cases, an exact
expression for the delay violation probability is complicated to
derive. However, queueing analysis can give statistical bounds
on this function. In particular, the stochastic network calculus
framework, introduced in Section IV, contains tools that are
appropriate for deriving an upper bound on pi(w) given the
underlying service process in (7). Such delay bounds are par-
ticularly suitable for performance evaluation in mission-critical
networks since they provide upper limits on the delay violation
probability, i.e., a real system operating under the assumed
conditions will certainly achieve a better delay performance.
F. Problem Formulation
Based on the system preliminaries outlined above, we are in-
terested in jointly studying the security and delay performance
impacts of PLA in the baseline scenario when Eve is inactive,
as well as under the considered adversarial strategies presented
in Section II-C. To be able to do this, we must first characterize
how the PLA error events and the different attack strategies
affect the link layer performance of the system, which we
capture through queuing analysis. That is, we seek the distribu-
tions of Nk and X
(i)
k given the behavior of Eve. This problem
is addressed in Section III. Next, we must analyze how the
PLA impacts the delay performance in the resulting queueing
system. We tackle this by deriving upper bounds on the delay
violation probability pi(w), subject to a given PLA threshold
T , corresponding pFA(T ) and pMD(i, T ), and the adversary
strategy. Derivations of the bounds are provided in Section IV.
Based on this analysis, we seek to answer if, and under which
circumstances, PLA is a viable option for authentication in
mission-critical communications. More specifically, we want
to answer what the baseline delay impacts on introducing
PLA are, how detection and delay performance scale with
the number of receive antennas NRx and the strength of LOS
componentKRice, and what impacts the considered adversarial
strategies have on the system. These among other questions
are finally studied through our numerical results in Section V.
III. ATTACK MODELING AND QUEUEING IMPACTS
In this section, we analyze how erroneous PLA decisions
impact the system and queueing service models that we
have introduced in Section II under each of the adversarial
strategies.
A. Baseline Scenario
In the baseline scenario, the adversary is inactive and the
queueing model is affected only by dropped messages due to
false alarms. We assume that a set DActive ⊆ {1, · · · ,Kd} of
6devices are active and that each has a constant arrival rate
αi, which means that each of the active devices will request
DTA resources in each frame. Considering one of the active
devices i, it will request resources with a DTA request in
the MGMT period. Since the adversary is inactive, the access
point will receive only one request with the ID of device i
and the message will be authenticated based on the single
message authentication di(h˜m)≷
H0
H1
T (see Section II-B). The
observed channel state h˜m will in this case be the authentic
channel CN (µi,Σ) and the false alarm rate is given by pFA(T )
in (5). Since we assume perfect channel-state information
and a frame period shorter than the coherence time of the
channel, the observed channel state will remain constant
during the frame. Hence, if the DTA request is accepted, so
will the following data payload message in the DTP3. Since the
requests independently get rejected by PLA with pFA(T ), the
number of scheduled devices follows a binomial distribution
p|IDTP|(k) =
(|DActive|
k
)
(1− pFA(T ))kpFA(T )|DActive|−k, (9)
and the distribution of Nk follows as pNk(n) = p|IDTP|(
NFrame
n ).
The threshold T is ideally set such that pFA(T ) is low, giving
a possible approximation |IDTP| ≈ |DActive|. For a particular
device i, the distribution of X
(i)
k is given by
Pr(X
(i)
k = 0) = pFA(T ). (10)
That is, in case of a false-alarm in frame k, the data buffer
observes zero service.
B. Detection of Data Injection Attacks
In a data injection attack, Eve transmits a DTA request in
the MGMT period with the aim of getting DTP resources for
transmitting a false data message. Either Eve impersonates an
inactive device i that is not requesting resources in the current
frame, in which case the DTA requests undergoes single-
message authentication and is undetected with probability
pMD(i, T ), or Eve impersonates an active device, in which case
the message is authenticated by L = 2 message authentication.
In the latter case, denoting by mi and mE the messages from
device i and Eve, respectively, a missed detection occurs in the
union of events
{
argmin
m=mi,mE
di(h˜m) = mE
}
and {di(h˜mE ) <
T }. In this case, the probability of missed detection, denoted
by pL=2MD (i, T ), can be written as
pL=2MD (i, T ) = P(di(hE) < di(hi), di(hE) < T )
= P(di(hE) < T )P(di(hi) > T )
+ P(di(hE) < di(hi)|di(hi) < T ).
(11)
We now use the notation di = di(hi) and dE = di(hE)
to discuss the probability (11). The second line of (11)
is simply pFA(T )pMD(i, T ). However, for the second term
P(dE < di|di < T ) an exact expression can only be obtained
in integral form. Instead, by noting that P(di < dE , dE <
3This is a consequence of our previous assumptions. However, if the
coherence time is shorter, or estimation errors are present, modeling of this
as a two independent authentication decisions would be straightforward.
T ) ≤ P(dE < T ) = pMD(i, T ), we can provide upper and
lower bounds
pFA(T )pMD(i, T ) ≤ pL=2MD (i, T ) ≤ pMD(i, T ). (12)
Additionally, we can observe that P(di < dE , dE < T ) ≤
P(dE < di) and provide an upper bound P(dE < di) ≤ pd(i)
in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The probability P(dE < di) can be upper bounded
by
pd(i) = min
−λ/2<t<1/2
(1+2(λ−1)t−4λt2)−NRxe− νiλt1+2λt , (13)
where λi =
PE(1+KRice)
Pi(1+KRice,E)
, and νi = 2(µE − µi)†Σ−1E (µE −
µi).
Proof. We rewrite P(di(hE) < di(hi)) = P(di(hi) −
di(hE) > 0) and use the Chernoff bound to get that for every
t > 0
P(di(hi)− di(hE) > 0) = P(et(di(hi)−di(hE)) > 1)
≤ E
[
et(di(hi)−di(hE))
]
= E
[
etdi(hi)
]
E
[
e−tdi(hE)
]
, (14)
where we have applied the Markov inequality and used the
independence of hi and hE . Now since di(hi) ∼ χ22NRx and
di(hE) ∼ λχ22NRx(νi) (see Section II-D), we get E[etdi(hi)] =
(1− 2t)−NRx and E[e−tdi(hE)] = (1 + 2λt)−NRx exp
(
−νiλt
1+2λt
)
for −λ/2 < t < 1/2 from the standard moment generating
functions for the corresponding distributions. Plugging these
expressions into (14) and minimizing over t yields (13) which
completes the proof.
The upper bound that is tightest out of (12) and (13) depends
on the authentication threshold T (clearly pMD(i, T ) → 1
as T → ∞ and pMD(i, T ) → 0 as T → 0 while pd(i) is
independent of T ). Hence, we tighten our bound on the missed
detection probability when Eve is launching a data injection
attack against active device i by
pL=2MD (i, T ) ≤ pMD,Upper(i) = min{pMD(i, T ), pd(i)}. (15)
This bound will additionally later prove useful when analyzing
the disassociation attack in Section III-D.
Remark 2. In a data injection attack, the delay performance
of legitimate devices will be affected since accepted DTA re-
quests from Eve will reduce the amount of resources scheduled
to other devices. However, this impact is principally the same
as under the Sybil attack discussed in Section III-C. Therefore,
we only use the data injection scenario to study the detection
performance of PLA, leaving questions regarding queueing
performance to be answered by the study of Sybil attacks.
C. Queueing Impacts of Sybil Attacks
Recall that in a Sybil attack, Eve targets a set of inactive
devices DSybil and sends DTA requests with the corresponding
IDs. Consequently, the access point receives messages from
7DActive∪DSybil in the MGMT period and needs to differentiate
which ones are legitimate. If Eve successfully gets many DTA
requests through, Nk given by (1) decreases and legitimate
devices get less resources which can result in growing queue
backlogs. Under a Sybil attack, we assume that active legiti-
mate devices DActive experience service dropouts modeled by
X
(i)
k the same way as in the baseline case (10); however, the
distribution of Nk is different due to Sybil IDs launched by
Eve.
Assuming all IDs in DActive ∪ DSybil are distinct (Eve is
assumed to target only inactive devices in the Sybil attack), the
number of devices that get resources in the data transmission
period is
|IDTP| =
∑
i∈DActive∪DSybil
I(di(h˜mi) < T ). (16)
We decompose |IDTP| = KActive + KSybil where KActive is
characterized by the baseline distribution of (9) (i.e., requests
rejected by false alarms) and
KSybil =
∑
i∈DSybil
I(di(hE) < T ) (17)
represents the number of Sybil IDs successfully launched
by Eve. For a moderate number of Sybil IDs (< 30), the
distribution of KSybil can be combinatorially approximated as
pKSybil(k) ≈
∑
B∈Ak
∏
i∈B
pMD(i, T )×
∏
j∈Bc
(1− pMD(j, T )),
(18)
where Ak denotes the set of all size k subsets of DSybil.
This approximation stems from an assumption that the events
{di(hE) < T }i∈DSybil can be approximated as independent,
in which case KSybil is Poisson-binomial distributed. Now the
distribution of |IDTP| under a Sybil attack can be written as
the convolution
pIDTP,Sybil(k) =
k∑
l=0
pKActive(l)pKSybil(l − k), (19)
from which the distribution of Nk follows as pNk(n) =
pIDTP,Sybil(
NFrame
n ).
The impact of the Sybil attack depends on the system’s
available resources NFrame: If NFrame by design allows all
devices to communicate simultaneously, the Sybil IDs will
not have a substantial impact on the service of the legitimate
devices. However, if the system is optimized to only have a
subset of devices communicating at a time (e.g., in order to
reduce latency or if only a subset of devices is involved in
a particular sensing tasks), the result of launching multiple
additional Sybil IDs might have severe impacts on the active
legitimate devices. An alternative counter-strategy is to only
accept requests from devices that are expected to transmit (e.g.,
sensors carrying relevant measurements for the running appli-
cation). However, such application-layer information might not
be available at the physical and MAC layers.
D. Queueing Impacts of Disassociation Attacks
In a disassociation attack, Eve targets an active legitimate
device and sends DCN request with the corresponding ID. In
an attacked frame, the access point will observe two messages
m1 and m2 with the same ID (i.e., ID(m1) = ID(m2)) and
uses (4) to decide which one is authentic. If the access point
accepts the DCN request from Eve, the legitimate device
will need to reconnect in order to continue its data transfer
which results in a disruption of the communication (i.e.,
sk = 0) for KRC consecutive frames which can lead to
growing backlogs and increased delay. In principle, Eve could
launch disassociation attacks against multiple links within the
network. However, here we model the queueing impact when
Eve targets a single device i.
In the disassociation attack, the frame-level service process
sk in (7) follows the same model as in the baseline scenario
(10) (i.e., frames are dropped with the false alarm rate and Nk
is given by its baseline distribution). We consider independent
Bernoulli attack attempts from Eve with probability pAttack and
to model the impact on the queueing performance, we divide
the data flow from device i to the access point into blocks
consisting of KRC frames each and define the aggregated
arrival process as a′l =
∑KRC(l+1)−1
k=KCNl
ak and service process
as
s′l =
{∑KRC(l+1)−1
k=KRCl
sk, if Dl = 0
0 if Dl = 1,
(20)
where Dl is a Bernoulli random variable indicating a success-
ful disassociation attack in the block. The distribution of Dl
is then given by
P(Dl = 1) = 1− (1 − pL=2MD (i, T )pAttack)KRC , (21)
where pL=2MD (i, T ) is the probability of accepting Eve’s DCN
message (i.e., the same situation as in the data injection
attack and hence pL=2MD (i, T ) is given by (11)). We recall from
Section III-B that a closed form solution for pL=2MD (i, T ) is
not available. However, since Pr(Dl = 1) is monotonically
increasing with pL=2MD (i, T ) ∈ [0, 1), an upper bound on
pL=2MD (i, T ) suffices to upper bound P(Dl = 1). An upper
bound on pL=2MD (i, T ) is given by (15) and hence we get an
upper bound P(Dl = 1) ≤ 1− (1− pMD,Upper(i)pAttack)KRC .
Our analysis of the disassociation attack serves as a worst-
case model due to the upper bound on P(Dl = 1). However,
since in the next Section IV we aim to upper bound the
delay violation probability, an upper bound on the disasso-
ciation probability suffice for this purpose. Additionally, we
acknowledge that other methods could be used for reducing
the impact of disassociation attacks. For example, one could
always choose DTA over DCN requests, which would render
the disassociation attack harmless as long as an active device
is targeted. However, we see this as an issue of protocol
design and include disassociation attacks in our studies in the
following.
IV. DELAY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we derive delay performance bounds for the
considered system using tools from stochastic network calcu-
8lus. We begin by introducing necessary results and notation
from the stochastic network calculus framework:
A. Stochastic Network Calculus
Stochastic network calculus is a mathematical framework
that allows us to analyze input-output relationships of stochas-
tic queueing systems through, for example, performance
bounds on delay or backlog given arrival and service dis-
tributions. For a complete overview of stochastic network
calculus, we refer to [10]. The work in [21] developed the
stochastic network calculus framework for wireless fading
links by observing that the analysis is simplified by converting
the bivariate stochastic processes A(τ, t), S(τ, t) and D(τ, t)
into A(τ, t) , eA(τ,t), S(τ, t) , eS(τ,t) and D(τ, t) , eD(τ,t).
This transformation allows the characterization of the random
service process in terms of the varying instantaneous SNR due
to fading. This is referred to as transforming the bit-domain
processes into the SNR-domain since the processes become
linear in the instantaneous SNR γk instead of logarithmic.
Arrival processes in the SNR-domain can then be seen as
instantaneous SNR demands. In bit-domain, stochastic net-
work calculus is based on a (min,+) dioid algebra over R+.
Stochastic network calculus in the SNR-domain, on the other
hand, is instead based on the (min,×) dioid algebra since
processes in the SNR-domain become multiplicative instead
of additive. The performance bounds, which can be seen as
variations of moment bounds, are derived in terms of Mellin
transforms of the involved queueing processes. The Mellin
transform of a random variable X , closely related to the
moment-generating function (MGF), is defined as MX(s) =
E[Xs−1].
The upper bound on the delay violation probability we
utilize in this paper is given by Lemma 2:
Lemma 2. For s > 0,
p(w) ≤ K(s, t+ w, t), (22)
where K(s, τ, t) is called the kernel and given by
K(s, τ, t) ,
min(τ,t)∑
u=0
MA(1 + s, u, t)MS(1 − s, u, τ), (23)
and MS(s, τ, t) = E[S(τ, t)s−1] and MA(s, τ, t) =
E[A(τ, t)s−1] are Mellin transforms of the SNR-domain ser-
vice and arrival processes.
Proof. See Theorem 1 in [21].
With i.i.d. instantaneous arrivals and service, we can write
MS(s, τ, t) = MS(s)t−τ and MA(s, τ, t) = MA(s)t−τ ,
where MS(s) , E[esk(s−1)] and MA(s) , E[eak(s−1)] due
to the independence of the instantaneous service and arrivals
sk and ak. Then, assuming stationarity of the underlying
queueing processes, we let t → ∞ in the righthand side of
(22) and get
lim
t→∞
K(s, t+ w, t) = MS(1− s)
w
1−MA(1 + s)MS(1 − s) , (24)
under the stability condition MA(1 + s)MS(1 − s) < 1
required for the sum in (23) to converge. Since Lemma 2 holds
for all s > 0, it follows that minimization of (24) over s > 0
gives us an asymptotic upper bound on the delay violation
probability. Hence, for the stable and stationary queueing sys-
tem, the upper bound on the delay violation probability can be
compactly written as p(w) ≤ infs>0 {limt→∞K(s, t+ w, t)}
with the objective function to be minimized given by the
steady-state kernel in (24). This function can be shown to
be a convex function for every s in the stability interval
MA(1+s)MS(1−s) < 1 (see Theorem 1 in [22]). However,
no analytical tools from convex optimization can be applied,
and therefore, one typically resorts to a numerical grid search
for the minimization over s.
Since in this paper we assume constant arrivals of α bits
per frame, the arrival process is deterministic and the Mellin
transform of the SNR-domain arrival process can easily be
found to beMA(s) = eα(s−1). The service process, following
the SIMO channel service model (7), has a more complicated
Mellin transform which we derive in the following subsections
for the considered attack scenarios.
It is worth noting that alternative stochastic network calculus
approaches exist that may be used for this analysis including
effective capacity [23] and MGF-based analysis [24]. Never-
theless, the usefulness of the approach in [22] that we employ
is most apparent when applied to wireless fading channels as
the Mellin transform MS is already derived for many fading
channels in the literature, e.g., [9, 11, 25]. This makes the
approach particularly attractive for wireless networks analysis.
B. Baseline Analysis
Recall that in the baseline scenario no active attacker is
present and frames are dropped with the false alarm rate,
i.e, Pr(X = 0) = 1 − pX = pFA. The service model is
given by (7) with Rk = log2(1 + h
†
khk) where we now,
for ease of notation, have dropped the user index i. Note
that in this section we assume the allocated resources Nk
to be deterministic, something we will later generalize when
deriving the Sybil attack bound. To simplify the derivation,
we define the functions h(γk, Xk) , esk and g(γk) = 1 + γk
in terms of the instantaneous SNR γk so that
h(γk, Xk) =
{
g(γk)
Nk
ln(2) , if Xk = 1
1, if Xk = 0.
(25)
In the following, we provide our main analytical result, which
is an approximate expression for the Mellin transform of g(γk)
in Theorem 1. From this result, the Mellin transform of the
service process in steady-state easily follows, as stated in
Corollary 1.
Theorem 1. For the Rice fading SIMO channel with mean µ
and covariance matrix Σ, the Mellin transform of g(γk) can
be approximated by
Mg(Γk)(s) ≈
e1/2αg (2αg)
s−1
Γ(kg/2)
×
∞∑
m=0
(kg−2
2
m
)
1
(−2αg)mΓ
[
s−m+ kg − 2
2
,
1
2αg
] (26)
9where Γ(s, x) =
∫∞
x
ts−1etdt denotes the upper incomplete
gamma function and αg and kg are parameters of the approx-
imate distribution of γk given by
αg =
1
2 (tr(Σ
2) + µ†Σµ)
1 + tr(Σ) + µ†µ
and kg =
(1 + tr(Σ) + µ†µ)2
1
2 (tr(Σ
2) + µ†Σµ)
.
(27)
Proof. We begin by using the fact that γk is a sum of
independent non-central χ2 distributed random variables with
E[γk] = tr(Σ) + µ
†
µ and Var[γk] = tr(Σ
2) + µ†Σµ. Now
we use that the sum of non-central χ2 random variables can
be approximated as a scaled central χ2 [26]. That is, we write
γk ≈ αgX , where X ∼ χ2kg . Transferred to the Mellin trans-
form, the approximation becomesMg(hk)(s) ≈M1+αgX(s).
Now, we seek
M1+αX(s) =
∫ ∞
0
(1 + αx)s−1
1
2
kg
2 Γ(kg/2)
x
kg
2 −1e−
x
2 dx
=
e
1
2α
(2α)
kg
2 Γ(kg/2)
∫ ∞
1
us−1(u− 1) kg2 −1e− u2α du︸ ︷︷ ︸
,I
, (28)
where in the second line we have used the change of variable
u = 1 + αx and defined the integral I which remains to be
solved. To solve it, we can use the binomial expansion (u −
1)
kg
2 −1 =
∑∞
m=0
( kg−2
2
m
)
(−1)mu kg2 −1−m, which plugged into
the integral I yields
I =
∫ ∞
1
us−1
∞∑
m=0
(kg−2
2
m
)
(−1)mu kg2 −1−me− u2αg du
=
∞∑
m=0
(kg−2
2
m
)
(2αg)
s−m+
kg−2
2
(−1)m
∫ ∞
1/2αg
ts−m+
kg−2
2 −1e−tdt
= (2αg)
k′+s
∞∑
m=0
(
k′
m
)
1
(−2αg)mΓ
[
s−m+ k′, 1
2αg
]
,
(29)
where we in the second to third line have used the change
of variable t = u/2αg and introduced k
′ =
kg−2
2 . Plugging
(29) into (28) yields (26). Finally, since E[αgX ] = αgkg and
Var[αgX ] = α
2
g2kg, we need αg =
Var[γk]
2E[γk]
and kg =
2E[γk]
2
Var[γk]
in order to match the two first moments of the approximation,
which completes the proof.
With the result of Theorem 1 in place, we get the service-
process Mellin transform through Corollary 1:
Corollary 1. For the baseline scenario, with Bernoulli frame
drops with probability pFA due to PLA, the Mellin transform
of the service process is given by
MS ,Baseline(s) =
(1− pFA)Mg(γk)
[
1 +
Nk(s− 1)
ln 2
]
+ pFA.
(30)
Proof. It follows by taking the expectation of h(γk, Xk)
s−1,
observing that Xk independent of γk and Bernoulli distributed
with pX = P(Xk = 1), and that pX = 1− pFA in the baseline
scenario. For mathematical details, we refer to [11, 12].
C. Analysis for Sybil Attacks
In a Sybil attack, the number of resources each device gets
assigned Nk ∼ pN(n) is varying depending on the success of
the adversary. We provide the Mellin transform of the service
process in this generalized case in the following corollary
(following from Theorem 1):
Corollary 2. Under Sybil attack, with scheduled resources
distributed according to pN(n) and frame-drops with the false
alarm rate pFA, the service-process Mellin-transform is given
by
MS ,Sybil(s) =
(1 − pFA)
∑
n
[
Mg(γk)
[
1 +
n(s− 1)
ln 2
]
pN (n)
]
+ pFA. (31)
Proof. Here, h(γk, Xk) in (25) is a function of the random
variable Nk as well. Following the same logic as in the proof
of Corollary 1, we find that
Mh(γk,Xk,Nk)(s) = Eγk,Xk,Nk
[
h(γk, Xk, Nk)
s−1
]
= pX
∑
n
[
Eγk
[
h(γk, 1, n)
s−1
]
pN (n)
]
+ (1− pX). (32)
Similarly to Corollary 1, we have
Eγk
[
h(γk, 1, n)
s−1
]
=Mg(γk)
[
1 +
n(s− 1)
ln 2
]
, (33)
and by plugging this into (32) and again noting that pX =
1− pFA, the proof of (31) follows.
D. Analysis for Disassociation Attacks
The modifications to the queueing model for disassociation
attacks are described in Section III-D. The delay bound in
Section IV-A applies to the block-aggregated service and ar-
rival processes s′l and a
′
l. However, with the redefinition of the
time scale, we now have p(w) = Pr(W (t) > KRCw). In the
following, we present the Mellin transforms of the aggregated
arrival and service process under these assumptions. Since
we assume constant arrivals of α bits per frame, we simply
have a′l = KCNα and MA,Disassociation(s) = eKCNα(s−1). What
remains is the Mellin transform of the aggregated service
process, provided in the following corollary:
Corollary 3. For the KCN aggregated service process under
a disassociation attack with success probability pd, the Mellin
transform is given by
MS ,Disassociation(s) = (1−pd)
[MS ,Baseline(s)]KCN +pd, (34)
where MS ,Baseline(s) is the Mellin transform for the baseline
scenario given by (30).
Proof. We note that MS ,Disassociation(s) is given by
10
E[es
′
l(s−1)] = (1− pd)E



KCN(l+1)−1∏
k=KCNl
h(γk, Xk)

s−1

+ pd
= (1− pd)
[MS ,Steady(s)]KCN + pd,
where we have used that h(γk, Xk) is independent for each
k.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we use our analytical results to study a
network consisting of Kd = 24 MTC devices deployed in
a square 20 m × 20 m grid, one access point placed at
the origin, and the adversary Eve positioned either outside
the network or representing a compromised device within
the network (see Fig. 2(a) for an example deployment). The
network is operating at carrier frequency fc = 2.4 GHz and the
access point antenna array has normalized antenna separation
∆r = 0.5 and is oriented parallel to the line y = −x. We
assume that all channel covariance-matrices are of the form
[Λ]i,j = ρ
|i−j| where ρ is a correlation coefficient. The delay
performance bounds are upper bounds on the delay violation
probability pi(w) < pi,Bound(w) computed as described in
Section IV-A, where the minimization over s is carried out
by a grid search. To specify the arrival rates αi, we compute
the rate corresponding to a fixed server utilization, defined as
u = E(ak)
E(sk)
.
A. Bound Validation
In Fig. 2(b), we show the delay violation probability for
device D12, evaluated through link-level simulations, together
with the corresponding bounds. In this figure, KRice = 6 dB,
ρ = 0, NRx = 4 and we have included results with PLA in the
baseline scenario, under Sybil attack, and under disassociation
attack, as well as results without PLA in the baseline scenario.
For the Sybil attack, we assume Eve launches |DSybil| = 4
Sybil IDs, and for the disassociation attack we assume the
reconnection time is KCN = 4 frames. We can observe that
in each scenario the analytical bounds and simulation results
follow the same slope with a gap of 1-3 orders of magnitude
between the curves; hence, our analysis can validly upper
bound the performance of the modeled system. Typically,
the gap between simulation and bound increases with the
slope of the curves. Therefore, the derived bounds will clearly
overestimate the true delay violation probability as seen in
Fig. 2(b). However, they provide us with an efficient (i.e.,
in the sense that computing the bounds is significantly less
computationally demanding than simulating the system) and
conservative (i.e., the true system will perform considerably
better than the bounds predict) way of evaluating the system’s
delay performance.
B. Baseline Performance
Fig. 2(c) illustrates the delay wǫ that can be analytically
guaranteed with a violation probability of ǫ = 10−6, i.e.,
pi,Bound(wǫ) = ǫ, for a given false alarm rate. For illustration,
we consider only a subset of devices covering the full range
of AoAs and distances. The value of wǫ varies little between
devices. This is beacuse arrival rates are adapted differently
for each device to fix the utilization u. Fig. 2(c) also illustrates
how PLA impacts the system: to get a low missed detection
rate we typically want to have a low threshold T . However,
decreasing T increases the false alarm rate, which clearly im-
pacts the delay performance guarantee wǫ. For this particular
scenario, we see that a false alarm rate approaching 10−2
can have an impact of 2-5 frames on the delay guarantee.
Higher utilization in Fig. 2(c) means that the arrival rates are
higher, resulting in an increased delay guarantee. However, we
observe that the delay shows a similar behavior with the false
alarm rate for both u = 0.5 and u = 0.9.
C. Data Injection Attacks
Here, we consider the detection performance of PLA in the
data injection attack. Delay impacts of data injection are not
studied in this case since these are similar to the Sybil attack,
as discussed in Section III-B.
a) Inactive device targeted: Fig. 3 shows the analytical
missed detection rate pMD(i, T ) when Eve launches a data
injection attack against an inactive device. In these figures,
we assume that Eve is positioned at (x, y) = (25, 0) [m],
targeting devices {D4,D8,D12,D16,D20}, and that the PLA
threshold is fixed at a false alarm rate pFA = 10
−2. Fig. 3(a)
depicts the missed detection rate for varying KRice with fixed
KRice,E = 0 dB. As expected, the missed detection rate
improves with stronger LOS component. We observe that the
detection performance for D4 is worse due to its location at
(0, 20) close to Eve. Additionally, we can observe that higher
antenna correlation has a positive effect on the missed detec-
tion rate performance. Fig. 3(b) shows the influence of KRice,E
on the missed detection rate for fixed KRice = 5 dB. For PLA
of devices far from Eve, a stronger LOS component from
Eve allows the access point to better differentiate messages
from Eve. However, for device D4 the missed detection rate
shows the opposite behavior since Eve’s channel more and
more resembles the legitimate channel. We can also see that
for low KRice,E (i.e, Eve’s channel is approaching NLOS),
the missed detection rate approaches the same value for all
choices of devices to impersonate. In Fig. 3(c), we plot the
missed detection rate for varying NRx showing that the missed
detection rate follows an approximately log-linear decrease
with NRx.
b) Active device targeted: Fig. 4(a) shows the missed
detection rate pL=2MD when Eve targets an active device from
dE = 30 m and varies her AoA from π/4 to 3π/4. The first
upper bound corresponds to pMD(T, i), the second to pd(i),
the lower bound correspond to pMD(T, i)pFA(T ) (see (12) and
(15) in Section III-B), and the solid curve is generated by
Monte Carlo simulation. We can observe that the gap between
the tightest upper bound and the true value is around 1 order
of magnitude. Additionally, this figure illustrates that there is
an optimal AoA for Eve to impersonate this particular device
with the highest success rate. In Fig. 4(b), we depict the upper
bound on pL=2MD , for each device, when Eve is choosing the
optimal AoA. Note that this is the upper bound and that the
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Fig. 2. (a) Considered MTC deployment. (b) Comparison of link-level simulations to derived bounds for device D12. (c) Delay guarantee wǫ with ǫ = 10−6
for device D12 in baseline scenario.
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Fig. 3. PLA detection performance under data injection attack with NRx = 8 when Eve impersonates {D4,D8,D12,D16,D20}: (a) For varying LOS
strength, (b) for varying attacker LOS strength, and (c) for varying number of receive antennas.
actual detection performance is around one order of magnitude
lower. We observe that for devices D1, D5 and D6, the missed
detection rate is very low (< 10−8), while the upper bound can
approach values higher than 10−1 for some poorly positioned
devices. Also, we observe that generally, the missed detection
rate is improved when Eve only has a NLOS channel (i.e.,
KRice,E = −∞ dB). As a single-antenna attacker, we note that
it is impossible for Eve to estimate the optimal AoA through
eavesdropping communications. Though through knowledge
of the deployment, Eve can position herself at a similar LOS
path as the legitimate device to optimize her chances of
success. However, if Eve’s objective is to impersonate several
devices simultaneously, the optimal AoA becomes conflicting
as illustrated by Fig. 4(b).
These results highlight two variables affecting the detection
performance of PLA for a given false alarm rate: (i) net-
work deployment and environment affecting LOS strengths
for legitimate channels and for Eve; and (ii) access point
design in terms of amount and placement of antennas. It
is clear that we can improve the missed detection rate by
adding more antennas and placing them such that antenna-
correlation is high. Moreover, by designing the deployment
and the immediate environment such that devices have a
strong LOS path to the access point, while Eve is unable
to get a strong LOS path (e.g., through deployment of the
system in a closed environment), we can improve detection
performance. Influencing channel characteristics for improved
PLA performance might be feasible in some scenarios (e.g.,
in a factory deployment). Moreover, deployments with strong
LOS components might be desirable for pure communication
reasons as well.
D. Sybil Attacks
Here, we assume that devices DActive =
{D12,D13,D14,D17,D18,D19,D22,D23,D24} (i.e.,
the upper-right quadrant of the deployment) are active and
that device D4 has been compromised and is launching a
Sybil attack. Fig. 5(a) shows E[KSybil], the average number
of Sybil nodes successfully launched by Eve, as a function
of the number of targeted devices |DSybil|. The solid lines
are computed according to our approximate distribution (18),
while the dashed lines correspond to simulation results,
showing that our approximation is accurate. We see that with
no PLA, Eve successfully gets every Sybil ID accepted. With
PLA and lower pFA, the number of successful Sybil nodes
is kept lower. For instance, when pFA = 10
−2, the expected
number of Sybil nodes does not exceed E[KSybil] > 2 even
though Eve can launch up to |DSybil| = 14 Sybil IDs, which
means that PLA is effective against the attack. However, it is
apparent from Fig. 5(a) that there are Sybil IDs that cannot
be detected by the PLA. The reason is that in the particular
scenario that we have investigated, Eve is device D4, and
hence, more easily impersonates devices {D1,D2,D3} due
to having the same AoA. Fig. 5(b) shows the delay guarantee
wǫ for D12 and ǫ = 10
−6 under the Sybil attack. We
can observe that without PLA, the increasing number of
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Fig. 4. Data injection attack when Eve impersonates an active device: (a) missed detection rate vs. attacker AoA when D12 is targeted, KRice = 6 dB and
KRice,E = 0 dB, (b) Upper bound on missed detection rate and Eve’s optimal AoA.
Sybil IDs launched by Eve has a severe effect on the delay
performance. For example, when the link utilization is high
(u = 0.9), Eve only has to introduce 4-5 Sybil IDs to cause
the delay in the queue to grow towards infinity. On the other
hand, by effectively detecting the Sybil IDs with PLA with
pFA = 10
−2, the delay performance can be made almost
independent of the number of Sybil IDs, at a cost of a
constant higher delay of around 3 frames.
E. Disassociation Attacks
Here, we assume that Eve is an external entity, positioned at
dE = 25 m and ΦE = π/3, launching a disassociation attack
targeting device D12. Fig. 5(c) shows the delay guarantee wǫ
for ǫ = 10−6 for the targeted device as a function of the attack
probability. In the results without PLA, we have assumed
that the access point performs random guessing whenever two
requests are received at the same time. For this case, we can
clearly see that the attack causes the delay to increase for
very low attack intensities, simply because the device gets
disconnected 50% of the times Eve sends a DCN request.
With PLA the impact is reduced and the system is able to give
delay guarantees even when pAttack → 1 and Eve is sending
DCN requests in every frame. For NRx = 4, we however see
an increase in wǫ with pAttack due to the occasional missed
detections. Fig. 5(c) also illustrates that this increase can be
mitigated by increasing the number of receive antennas to
NRx = 8.
F. Discussion
The PLA scheme studied in this paper can achieve missed
detection rates of around 10−6 and even as low as 10−10 under
certain channel conditions. These values can certainly meet
security requirements even in applications where message
integrity is of critical importance. Our results also indicate that
these security enhancements comes at a limited cost in terms
of delay: In the baseline scenario, given reasonable false alarm
rates pFA < 10
−2, our results show that a delay wǫ < 5 frames
can be guaranteed with a reliability of ǫ = 10−6. Furthermore,
PLA can assure reliable operation of the studied system, even
under hostile scenarios like Sybil and disassociation attacks
that are aimed at impacting the service on legitimate channels.
All these observations make a strong case for that PLA can be
a viable option for message integrity in mission-critical MTC.
Introducing multiple-antenna access points appear beneficial
from both a PLA security and a delay perspective. Already
with 4-8 receive antennas, we observe large benefits in terms
of missed detection rate that continues to improve in a log-
linear fashion. The benefits of introducing more antennas at
the access point can be interpreted in two ways: (i) improved
detection performance for a given false alarm rate, or (ii),
improved false alarm rate for a given detection performance.
That is, we can utilize extra antennas either to strengthen the
integrity of communication, or to reduce the delay impacts
(i.e., decrese false alarm rate). Our results also provide insight
into deployment strategies: We have seen that if many devices
are deployed along a straight line resulting in similar AoA
profiles, an external or internal attacker will be more effective
in impersonating this set of devices simultaneously. Hence, if
the deployment of MTC devices can be influenced for security
purposes, this can be used to make sure that Sybil attacks
targeting many devices are unlikely to succeed. Furthermore,
if certain devices transmit particularly sensitive information,
these can be placed in positions such that Eve’s success-rate
when impersonating is minimized.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied delay impacts of a feature-based PLA pro-
tocol in order to investigate the viability of PLA for mission-
critical MTC applications. Based on a MTC network model
consisting of multiple devices and a multi-antenna access
point we have derived delay performance bounds that quantify
the delay impacts of PLA. Evaluation of the derived bounds
for a network with a square-grid deployment of 24 MTC
devices shows that PLA can, under good LOS conditions,
be used without introducing excessive delays. Additionally,
we have found that PLA allows low-latency high-reliability
communication even under hostile attack scenarios such as
Sybil and disassociation attacks. As a means of improving
detection and delay performance, one could consider multiple
antenna-arrays deployed at separate locations in a distributed
manner. Additionally, in this paper we have limited the
analysis to a single-antenna adversary; however, this could
be extended to several adversaries with multiple antennas.
Moreover, channel estimation techniques and their effect on
the queueing model and authentication performance is still an
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Fig. 5. (a) Expected number of successful Sybil IDs E[KSybil] for various choices of pFA. (b) Delay performance impacts for D12 under Sybil attack. (c)
Delay performance impacts for D12 under disassociation attack.
open problem. Finally, our analysis could easily be modified to
encompass other authentication schemes (e.g., based on other
features or fingerprinting tags) and through this be used to
compare different PLA schemes from a delay perspective.
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